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**ARTIST
AT WORK**

**PROXIMITY OF ART
AND CAPITALISM**

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the time is not appropriate, the topos that enables the meeting does not exist.¹³² This means that a 'genuine exchange' has something to do with potentiality – with the ways in which we condition our common future. We could not work in the direction of the future without simultaneously changing our way of life, the material protocols of life itself, the way we shift time and experience it. To collaborate means to belong to another temporal concept – potentiality. This is the temporal concept of "time's darkness, the hushed shadows massing about the stage of what happens".¹³³

Chapter 4

Movement, Duration and Post-Fordism

4.1. The Free Time of Dance

In this chapter, let us once more return to the film *Workers Leaving the Factory* (1895). It shows workers from the Lumière factory as they flow through the factory door, leaving their workplace at the end of the day. The same film also opened the performance *1 poor and one 0* (2008) by BADCo., a Zagreb-based performance group.¹³⁴ The mass exodus from the factory not only marks the beginning of cinema history, but also the problematic connection between the cinema and work, which is also explored in Harun Farocki's documentary and text with the same title – *Arbeiter Verlassen die Fabrik* (1995).¹³⁵ In his commentary on the documentary, Farocki states that the primary aim of that movie was to represent motion using the mass exodus of the workers. In Farocki's opinion, there may even have been signs used to coordinate the movement of the workers. Interestingly, this invisible moment takes place along specific lines, those marking the difference between work and leisure time – between the industrial process and the factory on the one hand and the private lives of the workers on the other. The movement of the workers, their simultaneously organised and spontaneous dispersion in different directions, is choreographically organised and filmically framed along the line separating enclosed industrial space and private life, strictly rationalised life procedures and so-called flexible leisure time. This is a line between dull work organisation and leisure time when the workers can enjoy themselves; in other words, it divides the mass organisation of work and the atomised private lives of the workers. The dispersion of the workers renders their workspace invisible: the door of the factory is closed after their departure

and the space of work is left in darkness. Farocki mentions that throughout cinema history, the inside of the factory has only been illuminated when somebody wants to leave, demolish the factory or organise a strike. The inside of the factory has therefore only been featured when it becomes a space of conflict rather than a dull and repetitive space of work routine.¹³⁶

The entire performance *1 poor and one 0* revolves around that dividing line by means of constant re-entering through the aforementioned door, marked with a simple crossbar on the set. The performers repeatedly come through that door, copying the movement of the workers in the Lumière factory movie. It almost seems as though they were in a motion picture experiment by Edward Muybridge, combining many short sequences of movement to give the impression of time coordination. In-between those scenes, they discuss work-related issues: "What happens when you get tired? What happens when you leave the work behind? When the work we devote ourselves to makes us too exhausted? What comes after work – is it more work? What happens when there is no more work?" These discussions in the performance make clear references to the historical aspects of twentieth century work, especially to the gradual disappearance of that dividing line. In that sense, they add another aspect to Farocki's observation. The place of work is no longer in darkness, but dispersed everywhere; it is not only a constituent part of leisure time, but intrinsically connected to creative and transformative potentials. Through the constant repetition of movement from the 'the first choreographed film ever', the performance becomes a collection of fragments and memories of movement, revealing that the first movie arrives through a door that now seems to have been taken off its hinges. The movement of the workers gets captured on a doorstep that no longer exists; today, there is no longer a dividing line between the body movement subjected to the rational organisation of work and the dispersed atomisation of society. Not only is the division between work and

life erased in post-industrial society; the once essential qualities of life after work (imagination, autonomy, sociality, communication) actually turn out to be at the core of contemporary work.

How is the disappearance of the dividing line between labour and leisure time related to contemporary dance and the conceptualisation of movement? To be able to answer that question, I would first like to briefly reflect on the appearance of twentieth century contemporary dance forms, especially on the fact that their aesthetic and political potential was continuously formed in the complicated relationship with existing production modes. There are many intersections between the organisation of work production and the conceptualisation of movement in the history of contemporary dance (Taylorism, movement reforms, the return to the natural body, etc.); these intersections become especially intriguing when they intertwine with the political and aesthetic potential of dance.

It is well-known that, from the beginning of the twentieth century, new dance forms were experienced as something strongly connected to the potentialities of the contemporary human being. The autonomous movement of the body opened up new potentials of human experience and relationships, and had strong emancipating effects on understanding the future. The new, modern forms of dance (Isadora Duncan, Martha Graham, Mary Wigman etc.) seemed like a break-up with the old perception modes, whilst showing the possibility of new aesthetic experience. This was because of the intrinsic relationship between movement and freedom, which was presupposed in almost every attempt at movement reform. As Bojana Cvejić states, even today, "dance still works as a metaphor for going beyond contracts, systems and structures as models of theorizing subjectivity, art, society and politics."¹³⁷ According to Cvejić, that may be the case because "movement operates from the middle of things. Makes us step outside the pre-determination of points and positions. Expresses the

potential of moving relations."¹³⁸ It therefore seems that movement is intrinsically political, in the sense that it tackles the interrelations and dynamism of expressions, the potentiality of what movement could or could not be.¹³⁹

In that 'middle of things', movement also operates within the introductory image from the text, in the image where we see the workers exiting the factory. The movement is captured on film only to disappear into an unknown future; nevertheless, it starts at a particular doorstep, which frames the potential of moving relations in a very specific way. This potential is developed outside the rationalised organisation of work; it is the potential of movement that springs from life without work. The alliances, relations and divisions exist outside the factory, in the space without work, which not only becomes a political space, but also a field of autonomous aesthetic experience where the crisis of the subject and new forms of kinaesthetic perception were developed and institutionalized through the history of art in the twentieth century.

It is therefore no coincidence that the dance reforms of the early twentieth century appeared at a time when the movement of the working body in the Fordist factory was heavily rationalised – i.e. when the organisation of production was based on the scientifically researched kinaesthetic experience which instrumentalised the movement of the body for efficient production. The (mostly female) pioneers of dance (Isadora Duncan, Loie Fuller, Ruth St. Denis, Mary Wigman, Valentine du Saint Point etc.) started dancing at a time when the organisational model of work became omnipresent, when any kind of false, expressive, slow, stationary, unexpected, wrong, clumsy, personal, lazy, ineffective, imaginative, additional movement was eliminated from the work performed by the body.

The utopian relationship between movement and freedom in the beginnings of contemporary dance and dance reforms were therefore not connected to the notion of abstract freedom, but

expressed the potential of moving relations outside the factory door. This was a freedom of different kinaesthetic experience, which would not yield to instrumentalisation and efficiency and would not be subjected to work but discovered the inner potential of the body. One of the ways of describing this experience is the discovery of the 'natural body', which does not have so much to do with resistance to the mechanisation of contemporary life (whereby the term 'natural' could wrongly imply that it is only about the division between the natural and the artificial), but with the discovery of a new universality, a natural sympathy of one body for another, which is also described by John Martin for example.¹⁴⁰ The moving relations are no longer subject to dull routine and rationalisation, but vibrate part of the new atomised society of capitalism; they are the relations between the new kinaesthetic subjects.

I would like to argue that the appearance of dance reforms and modern dance provided a moving alternative to the kinaesthetic experience behind the factory door; subject to strict rationalisation and efficiency, which experience was completely different to the free relations between free time subjects. Movement experiments were also an important part of Fordist production and the social distribution of bodies in the industrial phase of capitalism. Scientific management (Taylorist) theories, for example, focused on the perfect synchronisation of the body with the machine, which demanded a radical and absolute interiorisation of movement in the body. Only in that way could the gestures of the body be separated from the experience and endlessly repeated; we could say that the working gesture can be separated from the experience of work.

The bodies of industrial workers are usually described as machines and their automatic work as alienated. Lurking behind such alienation is an interiorisation of movement so radical that the body of the worker actually becomes alien to the one who works with it. Only when the movement is radically interiorized

can the body become alien – the other body, which can serve the state or the factory. We are not dealing with the alienation of movement from the body, but with the radical interiorisation of movement in the body, so that the body becomes a space of constant quantitative division upon minimal and highly effective moves. Only in that way can a spectral and efficient working gesture be created and the movement not experienced as a change.

For this reason, Fordist production was often represented as synchronous group dance moving together; this dance often functioned as a critical representation of the subjugation of the worker's body to the industrialised and mechanistic factory production process. It does not come as a surprise that many popular representations of the assembly line introduced a clumsy worker who interrupted the group work process with his unforeseeable gestures, like Charlie Chaplin in *Modern Times*. These mocking and incapable workers destroyed the entire production process because they were too dreamy to be efficient and too clumsy to work well. This also means that they experienced movement as change. Rather than being efficient, they demolished the rationalised rules of movement. Rather than moving smoothly, they reacted to the obstacles and the materiality of the machine, with their uncontrolled gestures springing from their relation outside the body: they were being moved by the world and the objects they operated. The only way to disturb this collective process was often by means of the intervention of an individual body, a body that couldn't follow or was too clumsy, slow, dreamy, lazy or expressive – a body that took too much freedom to move, express itself or achieve something. The bodily traits that prevented the body dancing together with others were considered expressions of humanism, or even better – that of uncontrollable human nature, which cannot be disciplined. The individual kinaesthetic experience strongly resisted the group harmonization and its subjugation to the rationalised social

machine.

However, there is a difference between the interiorisation of movement in dance and the Fordist approach to movement; ultimately, workers can hardly dance, they have to work. Scientific management was therefore successful in interiorizing movement. It also tried to abolish any kind of additional pleasure that could expose the phantasmagorical character of the institution and thus expose it to ridicule: pleasure was radically expelled from the body. For this reason, modern dance pioneers at the beginning of the twentieth century re-evaluated the dynamic between the outside and inside of the body. They searched for a different kind of pleasure, connected to the autonomous aesthetic language of the body, which frees itself from the institutional and disciplinary grip. We can even say that the feeling of modernity and contemporaneity of dance, this disclosure of the kinaesthetic potentiality of the body, was connected to the new kinaesthetic experience of leisure time, to this unknown and dynamic transversal outside work, which is no longer subjected to the rational organisation and instrumentalisation of movement.

This is where we come to the core of the freedom implied in the emancipatory potential of dance. In the conceptualisation of movement in dance reforms, this was the freedom of time without work, the discovery of the potentiality of leisure time as opposed to the dull routine of movement at work. Movement expresses the potential of the moving relations in the creative time of the non-working subject. This can also be linked with the emerging consumer class, where movement opens to the unexpected, imagination, privacy, chance and flexibility, disclosing its expressive power. In this case, leisure time also becomes a time for new aesthetic experiences. Contemporary dance had to develop new techniques that would transform this freedom into a language, develop the open virtuosity of the moving body rather than the instrumentalised product, and

open up spontaneous movement as aesthetic language rather than the scientific naturalisation of movement. In this sense, the political and aesthetic potentiality of twentieth century dance was strongly intertwined with the exit from the factory.

What represented an expression of freedom in the capitalist societies of the twentieth century was considered a sabotage of society in a different ideological constellation – a representation of obsolete individualism, unable to adapt to the new transformations of society. I especially have communist countries in mind here, where the image of dancing together functions as a depiction of societies where the dividing line between the factory and private life was erased for ideological reasons. Communist systems adopted all the movement reforms in the production and work process, but with a different conceptualisation.

Socialist defenders of Taylorism (including Lenin himself) understood the scientific management of work as the management of the new society, where the door between the factory and private life would no longer exist. Beyond even this, there was a lot of discussion among Soviet communists and Russian avant-gardists about the hidden potentials of Taylorism and Fordism, which, in their opinion, went unnoticed by the Western capitalists who invented the two. Lenin writes that the Western (capitalist) implementation of Fordism resulted in the alienation of the workers and an authoritarian organisation of work. Socialist reformers and avant-gardists believed that the new modes of working together could transform society in general. The simultaneous movement of the workers was understood as a transgressive and transformative poetic form through which the development of a new society could be achieved. This was also the conviction of A.K. Gastev, one of the chief engineers and directors of the Central Institute of Labour in Moscow (he became director in 1920). Not only did Gastev introduce Taylorist methods in the USSR and develop them further, but was also a famous poet celebrating the new power of industrialised labour

and the merging of the human being with the machine. In his poems, he developed a rhythmical language to describe new production, where the workers would move and transform the entire historical epoch by means of their joint labour.

"When the morning whistles resound over the workers' suburbs, it is not at all a summons to slavery. It is the song of the future. There was a time when we worked in poor shops and started our work at different hours of the morning. And now, at eight in the morning, the whistles sound for a million men. A million workers seize the hammers at the same moment.

*Our first blows thunder in accord. What is it that the whistles sing? It is the morning hymn to unity."*¹⁴¹

It is well-known that the movement reforms of the Russian avant-gardists (e.g. those of Meyerhold, Foregger, and partially – in another context – those of Laban) were heavily influenced by the new production process in terms of its abstraction and rationalisation. The aim of movement reforms was to develop an effective gestural language. In other words, they wanted to develop a new kinaesthetic dynamism that could be achieved by means of the efficient use of gesture and the instrumentalisation of the body. For example, Meyerhold began to rationalize the movement apparatus, in which the actor's body also became a model for a general optimization of movements. Although his work was closely connected to Gastev's and Taylor's utilitarian production models, Gerald Raunig states that the methods Meyerhold employed went in another direction: he also wanted to denaturalize theatre.¹⁴² Contrary to the psychology of the plot, the empathetic audience and the singular kinaesthetic experience of the dancing body, which developed an autonomous aesthetic language in the West (especially in North America), the movement in the concepts of the Russian avant-gardists (or important components of biomechanics) consisted of the rhythm

of language and the rhythm of physical movement – the postures and gestures arising from the collective rhythms that coordinated the movement of the body and that of the bodies with one another.

In the twentieth century, we can therefore observe two different relations between the conceptualisation of movement and the organisation of production (work itself). In the so-called western societies, more accurately described as 'capitalist', we can analyse processes of movement naturalisation that opposed the instrumental use of the working body and the rational organisation of society. This naturalisation of movement runs in parallel to the discovery of the singular subject, a desiring individual with his/her transversal and transgressive dynamic movement outside the modes of production (metaphorically speaking, outside the factory gates). This individual is mostly understood as constantly in movement and in a process of continuous creativity and autonomous aesthetic language, an individual who cannot but dance.¹⁴³ Another proposition came through the factory gate – the idea that the modes of production could be intertwined with the transformation of society in general.

The movement reforms of the historical avant-gardes erased the doorway between work and private life; they came across as kinaesthetic constructions of future worlds. In the movement reforms of the Russian avant-gardists and the European avant-garde (especially the Futurists), the fascination with industrialised production modes led to experiments in the denaturalisation of movement, where the body became a field of experimentation for a future social transformation and an understanding of future commonalities. In this, dance and the production process opened the way to the exploration of a new generality of the human being, a generality that comes before any kind of individualisation in the sense of the political generality of the future that is still to come.

Unfortunately, the discovery of the movement of this generality was an utter failure; it quickly lost its emancipatory political potential and became a totalitarian unity of the communist regime. In capitalist societies, clumsy, still, expressive, lazy, dreamy, everyday and marginal movement is understood as an intervention of liberated singularity; in communist societies such movement sabotages the whole social machine. In their utopian pursuance of the future, communist societies erased everything that radically existed in the present, cynically believing that the future had already arrived. It is therefore not surprising that the communist regimes actually celebrated the most conservative and disciplinary forms of dance, like massive gatherings of people or disciplinary ballet institutions.

The immense aesthetic and political differences in the early twentieth century must be connected with the processes of the radical interiorisation of movement at many different levels, including the approaches of contemporary dance pioneers. In spite of all the differences, the dance pioneers re-evaluated the dynamic between the inside and outside of the body, with the dance artists (mostly women) wanting to liberate movement and bodily expression as a force coming from the inside of the body. In these reforms, human subjectivity became the ultimate source of movement, a source so strong that it could abstract its own body into an autonomous aesthetic field. In this case, we are talking about the disclosure of inner freedom as a specific kinetic abstraction that can therefore also be connected to the fact that, in the conceptualisation of movement by dance reformers, this freedom was the freedom of time without work, i.e. the discovery of the potentiality of leisure time as opposed to the dull routine of work movement.¹⁴⁴ This comparison between two conceptualisations of movement, with the political potential of dance in the movement of the singularity on the one hand, and the discovery of the new (political) generality of the human being on the other (especially in the case of avant-garde concep-

tualisations), gives rise to a very interesting observation from today's perspective.

We are namely living in a time when the door between the factory and leisure is being erased, when the potentiality of the individual and autonomous creativity are at the centre of production. The movement of this working rhythm is very different to the description in Gastev's poem, which actually celebrates the disappearance of the factory door. Instead of the synchronised totality of work, which he extols as a new transformation of society and represents with the image of 'everybody starting at the same time', the new transformation of today's society takes place through disharmonious working rhythms, flexible work times and individualised and displaced work. The factory whistle is replaced by free-will and silent deadlines, driving people into many simultaneous and connected activities in life and work. Celebrated throughout the twentieth century as the discovery of the potentiality of freedom, the movement of the individual now stands at the centre of appropriation; its affective, linguistic and desiring aspects are exploited. We have to dance in a flawless and conceptual diachronicity while creating the present and changing places, times and identities; this must take place with speed and with only short (but not very destructive) outbursts of crisis. This is the new universality of the post-industrial world and its mode of production.

This brings us to *Pontoffel Pock, Where Are You?*¹⁴⁵, a 1979 cartoon by the well-known American cartoonist and satirical author Dr. Seuss (Theodor Seuss Geisel). Once again, we chance upon a satirical image of workers dancing together; the working process in a pickle factory is depicted as a harmonious musical. However, one of the new workers, Pontoffel Pock, is quite a loser – clumsy, disruptive, poor and unhappy. Clumsy by nature and a daydreamer by heart, he tries to push and pull the machine like the other workers; his eagerness to do well destroys the entire factory and he is accompanied to the exit in disgrace. In his self-

pity, he is approached by an angel, who introduces himself as a representative of a global corporation with branches all over the world. As the corporate angel sings, Pontoffel Pocks life is to be pitied and he is offered a magic piano; he only needs to play a few tones and push the pedals to fly to any exotic destination in the world and experience the most beautiful and exciting adventures. He again causes trouble with his behaviour – due to his unpredictable gestures and movements, due to his desiring body and to ‘always being in the wrong place’. He simply cannot enjoy himself and be spontaneous, but always breaks social relations with his ill-timed actions. This goes on until he finds the love of his life (an Arabian princess) and gets one more chance at the pickle factory.

The cartoon offers a good example of the shift that took place in the early 1970s and can today be described with the notions of post-industrialism or post-Fordism, especially in connection with the modes of working. The main characteristics of this shift are great changes in the organisation of production and the role of work, influencing social relations in general. Creative, linguistic and affective work becomes the centre of production. Work is no longer organised in an instrumental and rationalised manner, behind the factory door, but becomes part of the production of sociality and the relationships between people. Creative, spontaneous, expressive and inventive movement, which used to be excluded from the denaturalised movement of the Fordist machine, is now at the core of production. The essence of contemporary production calls for creative and potential individuals, with their constant movement and dynamism promising economic value. Illustrating production as a form of dancing together is obsolete nowadays, also due to the ineffectiveness of its social critique. Today’s Fordist machinery moves away from visibility to countries with a cheap labour force with no escape to leisure, only a brutal exploitation of life in all its aspects. The contemporary post-Fordist worker is no

longer part of the rationalised machine, but rather that of affective and flexible networks, with his or her potentiality up for sale.

However, there exist new forms of dancing together that are much more connected to the kinaesthetic arrangement of everyday life, which is closely connected to the ways in which we live and work today. In 2006, Natalie Bookchin created a video installation entitled *Mass Ornament*, in which she reflected on the role of mass ornament of today.¹⁴⁶ At the beginning of the twentieth century, the mass ornament functioned as an aesthetic reflex of the rationality of the prevailing economic system, which I analysed as a rationality that heavily interiorized movement so that the body could effectively produce. So, what could a mass ornament be today?

The question gave rise to the aforementioned work by Bookchin; she collected hundreds of YouTube videos of people dancing and made them into a synchronous choreography. Everybody dances alone in his or her own room, usually with a television screen in the background where the same dance is performed. Bookchin choreographed and composed the recordings on the basis of similar moves, gestures and dances that the dancers had made in private. The result is a peculiar choreographic distribution of bodies dancing the same dance or in the same way, always alone, in private yet nevertheless in a public and connected way. Such choreographic distribution could easily be achieved by means of a computer algorithm (if it had the right parameters like 'find people dancing to Shakira's song', or 'find people turning their heads in the living room' etc.). Such automatic selection and combination is actually performed regularly in surveillance centres where recordings of security cameras are analysed.

In comparison to the universal rationality of Fordist production, Bookchin's work creates an ornament of isolated private rooms and the showing-off of bodies exposed in their

difference, which is also a difference of radical sameness: a movement where change is but spectral and replaced by a constant quantitative division of the differences of those who are trying to learn the same popular dances and show the same virtuosity.

This tells us that the exploitation of the human ability to move does not have the same ideological constellation today that it had in the disciplinary societies where movement was interiorized so deeply that the body became a kinetic machine, a small but smoothly operating cog in the giant social machine. The role of movement in post-Fordism has to be analysed in connection with the exploration of everyday movement and 'what bodies usually do', i.e. how they move with the world. This not only speeds up and erases the 'ontological slowness' and transformative potential of bodies, but creates a radical incongruity between the 'movable ones' and those expelled to eternal stillness.

If we claim that movement stands at the centre of production and that it is exploited as human potentiality, then this also implies that, today, change or alteration is radically abstracted from it. Movement only exists as an accelerated flexibility of contemporary subjectivity. In this way, movement enables freedom as temporal enslavement. We could say that, due to the appropriation of movement, "productive powers shade into powers of existence."¹⁴⁷ The non-materiality of contemporary work, its 'spatial' independence, is based on the exploitation, or even better, the exhaustion of these generic human forces – i.e. on the appropriation of movement as one of the forces of life.¹⁴⁸ This means that the production of today is experienced as something spontaneous and flexible, where the process of work is always subject to our own initiative.

In this sense, we can also understand another image of dancing together, one that has been appearing in recent years in the countries of the post-industrial world – the huge flash mobs organised by corporations and TV companies. On the surface,

these dancers seem to celebrate the spontaneity and affectivity of human relations; what they really celebrate are commercialised joy and spectacular togetherness. It is therefore necessary to rethink the consequences of the changes in the modes of working for the conceptualisation of contemporary dance, especially if we claim that the political and aesthetic potentiality of dance was discovered in relation to the production process. What would the consequences for contemporary dance be with these changes in mind? What would the disappearance between work and non-work mean for the relation between dance and freedom, which was always kind of self-evident when reflecting on many dance reforms of the twentieth century?

First of all, it should not be overlooked that the relationship between dance and freedom no longer has anything to do with resistance to the rigid and disciplinary production modes. Unexpectedness, non-hierarchical structures, affectivity and linguistic/bodily expressiveness have entered post-industrial production and represent the core of post-Fordism as the new organisation of the production we live in. The autonomy of creativity and aesthetic experience, which was so important when the resistance to the rationalisation of labour first emerged, now represents an important source of production value. We therefore have to observe the relationships between contemporary dance and the new production modes, which have placed movement and constant flexibility at their centre, along with expressive and spontaneous individual creativity.

Today, subjugation consists of constant movement, flexible relations, signs, connections, gestures and a continuous dispersion outside the factory gate with the intention of producing (and spending) even more. The production of today encourages a constant transformation and crisis of the autonomous subject, with the intention of capturing that subject's creative outbursts and transmuting them into value. There has to be ceaseless collaboration, temporary but not too affective,

otherwise it can become inappropriate and destructive.

In an interview, Paolo Virno describes the way post-Fordist workers acquire their skills. The qualities of a post-Fordist worker never require skill in the sense of professional expertise or technical requirements. Quite the contrary, what's required is the ability to anticipate unexpected opportunities and coincidences, to seize chances that present themselves, and 'to move with the world'. Such skills are not learnt at one's workplace. Nowadays, workers acquire such abilities by living in a big city, gaining aesthetic experiences, having social relationships and networking.¹⁴⁹

To move with the world (and attain skills, knowledge, aesthetic experience and collaborative networks in the process) stands for specific skills that are, of course, connected to cognitive work. To move with the world can also be understood as a specific exploitation of the human abilities of movement. The relational aspect of movement is at the centre of today's exploitation. The movement of the body is therefore exteriorised; it no longer dwells inside the body as was the case in twentieth century Fordism, where the interiorisation of the movement enabled one to be a part of the larger social machine. Today's subjectivities are flexible because its bodies are organised by means of constant protocols of the acceleration and organisation of everyday and common movement. This kind of distribution enables experimentation with temporality, whereby change is accelerated and spectral. There is no time for hesitation when you move with the world.

The result is a typical form of contemporary subjectivisation or rather desubjectivisation, confronted with the brutal intensification of the processes of individuation, with old forms of life becoming obsolete even before we are able to absorb them. One is therefore compelled to live in a constant state of tension on the verge of despair. Such intensification would not be possible without the exteriorization of movement, in which the interre-

lation of movement is continuously manipulated and regulated by the protocols of the contemporary society of control. Any potential for change dwindles into ineffective, spectral flexibility. As a result, human subjectivity becomes a source of many possibilities without any influence on reality.

There is something deeply choreographic about today's social machine, which discloses its own compositions through the constant organisation of smoothness, acceleration, non-disturbance and the illusion that movement has nothing to do with disturbance. The material for this kind of social choreography comes from what bodies can do: their everyday mobility and numerous movements through numerous protocols of transgression, which are heavily controlled and regulated. One of the basic illusions of the contemporary subject is that we only move due to an inner feeling of time. This illusion serves as a basis for constantly subduing contemporary subjectivity to numerous apparatuses that promise an ever greater mobility to defeat our ontological slowness. The time of the subject is not a homogeneous time projecting into the future, i.e. a possibility that constantly needs to be realised. Rather, it is about constantly avoiding obstacles, involuntary movement, and slowness that makes time run out.

This makes contemporary dance a political field where proposals within the human ability to move can be explored and connected to the broader social and political reality. In this sense, it needs to bring together the two politics of twentieth century dance: dancing and walking. Subversive pleasure comes from the distance that the dancing body has towards the institutional mechanisms of the exteriorisation of movement, precisely because it can dance. In this sense, the ability to move can resist the economic and social organisation of the relational aspect of movement and open up other embodied ways of moving together that continuously create flows of disturbances and affective persistence.

With its various rhythms, movement can create tensions and put pressure on the seemingly smooth protocols of the contemporary capitalistic world. Today, this need for the moving body is quite apparent in the changed protest strategies such as the 'Occupy' movements, which switched from disembodied networks and global movements to localised but connected forms of temporal persistence and endurance in certain places – to a durational search for new political embodiments. That is why this pleasure can create radical political disruption even if it belongs to the quantitative organisation and distribution of bodies. This pleasure needs to be linked with the ability of everyday movement to induce change, in the ways in which we should think of movement as a qualitative disturbance, a constant changing of the forces of life, a temporal dynamics and materiality of space. This pleasure springs from the fact that movement can induce change, that it can function as an important point of differentiation between spectral change and change that directly affects the body and its relations to the world.

If this is the case, we need to ask the following important question: what exactly do we do when we work – or more precisely, what do we do when we work with dance? The political potentiality of dance is not connected to the space outside work, where the body is free to move and disclose its potentiality of being in time and space; it needs to be placed in dialogue with the modes of flexible production and non-material contemporary work.

It is well-known that the production of contemporary dance is becoming flexible today due to constant movement, in which the exchange of forever young and forever experimental artists (a cheap labour force for the increasingly globalised performance market) goes hand in hand with spectacular shows in order to encourage collaboration for collaboration's sake, and with the continuous movement of the labour force being unavoidable. We

tend to forget that there is a materiality to dance and movement, not only that of the body but also that of time and space. It is not abstract and does not rush into the spectral kinetic flow; it is also graspable, located, stuck, partial, rough and ill-timed. This materiality resists the contemporaneity of time and somehow sabotages the spectral appearance of 'the now'; it gives a different rhythm to the flow of time. This materiality can also be connected to the materiality of work in general; dance is very close to work issues in this sense as well.

Dance is not close to work issues because it can function as a representation of work or an image of the working process, but because it *is* work in terms of its material rhythms, efforts and the ways in which it inhabits space and time. It is work in the sense that bodies distribute themselves in space and time, relate to each other and spend or expand their energies. Therefore, the political potentiality of dance should not be searched for in the abstract or democratic idea of freedom and infinite potentiality of movement, but in the ways in which dance is deeply intertwined with the power and exhaustion of work, with its virtuosity and failure, dependence and autonomy. In that sense, dance practice of the last few decades has been stressing its own ontological propositions (e.g. dance equals movement; production and collaboration in dance; the relationship between dance and theory).

All these propositions testify to the fact that dance practice is strongly aware of the relationship between dance and work. If dance is work (and not something opposite to it, in which dance is finally liberated from the materiality of work), then the political potentiality of dance can also be understood as an interesting repetition or replacement of the avant-garde gesture: what would the proposition that dance is work mean for the society that is still to come? Is it possible to find an alternative to the continuous movement and speed, to the flexibility of bodies and spaces, to the dispersion of the energies and power of bodies

congregating only due to advertising campaigns and massive spectacles?

One of the possible answers would be the following: dance can reveal that kinetic sensibility not only flows, but opens up caesuras, antagonisms and unbridgeable differences. In this sense, many of the dance performances of the last decade have called for a connection between movement and dance as well as for a broadening of the notion of choreography. Another answer would be that the materiality of dance can resist the abstracted notion of work and reveal the problematic connection between the abstracted new work modes and bodies. New work modes namely have a tremendous power over bodies, especially since they increasingly erase every representable and imaginable generality of bodies. The dancing body no longer resists dull working conditions and does not search for a new society outside work; it can have the power to reveal that the materiality of bodies distributed in time and space can change the ways we live and work together. This politically and aesthetically transgressive line between work and non-work can open up the potential ways of the society of the future.

4.2. Slowing down Movement

In order to understand how movement is connected with change and how this opens numerous ways of contemporary perception, it is necessary to think of movement in its relation to time. On 17th November 2007, in one of their *Ballettikka Internettikka* guerrilla actions, which intervened into various spaces using robots and other miniature mechanical devices for a decade, and broadcast these events online, Igor Štromajer and Brane Zorman illegally brought a robot to the top of the famous Lippo Centre in Hong Kong. On the other side of the world, at an equally eminent avant-garde art venue, the Hellerau Festival House in Dresden (Germany), the audience was waiting for the broadcast of this 'illegal' guerrilla ballet action, which was scheduled for 10

PM CET. The steps of the action and the schedule of the preparations for the ballet were planned up to the minute, in accordance with the illegal nature of the event. Temporality came second to the strategic effect of taking over the space and synchronicity served the realization of the planned event.

Through a series of short electronic messages from the two authors, the audience was notified in advance about all the details of the action and the ascent of the Hong Kong skyscraper, on top of which *Ballettikka Internettikka: Stattikka* – an ‘almost static but still transitive net ballet’ was supposed to take place. At 10 PM, giant projections began in the Hellerau Hall. On its walls, ceiling and floor, the image of the robot appeared. With two red lights as eyes, the robot was situated on a concrete edge made of white ceramic tiles, as though it were just about to take a new step. Behind it, one could see the glittering and rhythmically pulsating lights of the Hong Kong metropolis, a night without proper darkness. Throughout, there was a sound as though someone were continually changing the (local) radio stations. The length of the transmission was determined in advance: 35 minutes. After the first two minutes, the head technician in charge of the transmission to the hall skyped the two authors atop the Hong Kong skyscraper: “Hey, is everything ok? When will things start? There’s nothing happening here yet.”¹⁵⁰ The authors replied that everything was fine. After 35 minutes of transmission, a meticulously scheduled and synchronised descent took place, followed by securing the equipment. The level of risk involved in the action was assessed as the maximum by the two authors.

Indeed, when are things going to start? The question of the technician in charge of the connection between Dresden and Hong Kong was not that of a person technically skilled but ‘uninformed’ in the field of contemporary art. Rather, it mirrored the increasingly uncomfortable atmosphere in the hall; after a few minutes, people began to fidget, walk around and many

actually left the hall. The artistic director of the festival, Johannes Birringer, later described the various reactions of the audience in his blog. While some people were enthusiastically following the authors' project, others almost meditatively yielded themselves to the transmission on the screens, and still others felt a deep frustration, perhaps even anger, and left the hall in protest. After the performance, Birringer's blog also featured a discussion between the authors of the transmission and some members of the audience. The general findings could be summed up in two points: a) that not much happened; and b) that if the audience had been more informed about the context of the performance, they might have been more accepting of the 'considerable or complete lack of goings-on'. The reaction of the audience testifies to the fact that duration can be problematic, especially in a technological context: if duration becomes independent, it needs a context. It needs to be filled with something before its slowness begins to get to us – we simply need to know *why* things have stopped.

Ballettikka Internettikka: Stattikka could be classified as a networked performance, i.e., a performance that broadcasts a real time and space event over the Internet, which, in *Ballettikka's* case, featured a mechanical robot/toy as the main dancer. For these reasons, the performance raises quite a few issues related to the relationship between duration and barely perceptible movement. *Ballettikka* was part of Tele-Plateaus, a festival programme that, by means of broadcasts from various parts of the world, attempted to open up a platform for experimentation with synchronous temporalities and reflect on new event concepts established by the relations between technology and performance.¹⁵¹ One might expect that duration, the expansion of the event, cannot intrigue an audience that is used to performances where the time dimension is heavily experimented with (the perception of time by the audience, etc.). In *Ballettikka Internettikka: Stattikka* something paradoxical takes place. The

connection works and the broadcast is successful, but it seems as though something went wrong; there is duration, but it comes across like a failure; there is slowness, but it seems as though it resulted from some sort of technical malfunction.

Placed on the white-tiled edge with the city view behind it, the robot/toy is not moving, but it is being transmitted. In this way, it embodies the very title of the performance – static ballet. Although the event is broadcast successfully, it seems as though the connection was not working, and we could quickly begin to feel that this unique ‘non-event’ is wasting our time.

When something does not function (the body, a machine, a car, a computer, a vending machine), the duration literally intervenes into the subject that witnesses this halt. It seems as though our inner sense of time was appropriated by the non-functioning machine; the subject suddenly feels that he/she has been dispossessed – and needs to slow down and wait. This slowing down and waiting is frequently felt in contemporary culture when the dispositives that regulate and organize our flexible subjectivities no longer work: for example, the protocols of moving through the city, social networks, airports, motorways, mobile phones. These kinds of halts in motion or slow-downs have a direct influence on the body as they appropriate the temporality of the subject, organized as endless flexibility, simultaneity and adaptability in today’s times. In moments like this, we say that we are stuck, with little else to do but hang in there and become powerless observers of our own chronological time. According to Agamben, time flies by for observers of their own chronological time; they are never left with any of it and always miss their own selves.¹⁵² All the dispositives we use to establish ourselves as subjects today promise speed and effectiveness, not only in our actions but also in our subjectivisation processes. The greater the speed promised by the dispositives, the less tolerant and the more affective our responses become when something remains stationary instead of working. Most of us feel agitated within

several seconds when a desired computer programme does not open; we feel like giving the computer a smack, just like we used to do with the old televisions when the image was flickering and unstable. When something is stopped, it seems as though our subjectivity of the one stopped will be disabled, as though it will be dispossessed. Perhaps the affective response is a consequence of the fact that it is duration that shows that we ourselves are actually not moving, but are being moved, that our inner perception of time (the time of someone who freely and flexibly projects their own subjectivity) is in fact heavily socially and economically conditioned.

In many of their projects, Igor Štromajer and Brane Zorman purposefully contrast mutually exclusive temporalities. On the one hand, the almost 'theatrical' preparation for the event (which cannot be seen during the transmission) gains a classic dramaturgical structure through the constant acceleration and division of the time of the action. On the other hand, the live broadcast of the event is a long way from the accumulated and anticipated effect. The artists contrast two exclusive temporalities that can also be understood as the two basic inner temporal qualities of the contemporary flexible subject. On the one hand, the subject today is fully subjugated to the concept of accelerated time and organized through precise time management of its actions and movement; everything (including human potentiality) is organized in time sequences that are supposed to lead to a certain effect. On the other hand, the inner time of the subject can also be described as an escalation of redundant time (time in which we are stuck), slowness, motionlessness, stasis and non-functioning. In this way, *Ballettikka Internettikka: Stattikka* mirrors an interesting dynamic in the contemporary experience of temporality, where the activity of the subject constantly intertwines with fatigue. At the very moment when the clock begins to tick and the hall is illuminated on the other side of the planet, the investment of the two authors in the event (on both the

concrete and phantasmagorical levels, which makes the audience eager in its expectations) is flattened into the static but transitive image of movement that has stopped, a still image. The investment, the entire preparation for the event, becomes consumption without an effect, a waste of energy and actions to produce an effect that is too slow, a 'lesser effect', so to speak. There is a specific incapability at work in relation to the expectation of what could happen in *Ballettikka*, a specific exhaustion of the event itself.

This dynamic of action and fatigue could also be compared to the economic relationship between the time of the investment and the time of the consumption. The time of the investment, although flexible and multi-layered, is also homogenous. Today, time is structured in a projective manner: one needs to achieve an effect and realize future goals. This directly contributes to the (subjective) feeling of time acceleration. At the same time, the consumption of investments has become too plentiful and is downright redundant. Not only does it have harmful effects on our habitat (natural or social), but also underlies the experience of subjectivity as redundancy, dissatisfaction, insufficient gains, a phantasmagorical waste of energy and resources that brings exhaustion instead of an affirmation of subjectivity.¹⁵³ The subject's crisis therefore springs from this excessive dynamic of investment and consumption, where the body of the subject is frequently taken over by fatigue, a form of stillness that comes directly from excessive speed: in our culture, speed and slowness seem to be in direct and traumatic opposition. In all its formations, especially those playing with the contexts of break-in and illegality, *Ballettikka* plays with these feelings of time organization through expectation and the consumption of time – with the expectation of the event and its actual realisation.

Similar feelings are triggered by *NVSBL* (2007), a dance performance by Eszter Salamon. This is just one of a number of dance performances where movement has been reduced to a

minimum; it has analogous qualities to the unsuccessful movement of the robot in the video projected in the Hellerau Hall. It is true that this performance features the barely perceptible movement of live bodies; however, there is something comparable in the way in which the bodies are slowed down inside a decelerated image, as they would be if recorded in slow motion. The title of the performance is deliberately without consonants; the word itself resembles the movement in an image broadcast with a delay effect. Very slowly, four dancers appear from the background, motionless and yet moving. Their bodies seem to slide from one flickering image to another, but cannot actually be retained in the memory. A comparison could easily be made with a broadcast where the image is unstable, delayed and the transmission is not functioning properly.

The performance, which is difficult to describe without reducing it to the logic of the events, has been captured by the philosopher Cristina Demaria in the following way: "On stage we watch the imperceptible and therefore invisible movements of four dancers who emerge very slowly from a dark background: with their bodies, and with a miraculous play of lights, they are not so much composing figures as being figures, apparently motionless but actually changing. Figures that become channels of a 'logic of sensation' (Deleuze), at times also laboriously alienating for a public accustomed to seeing and therefore judging what it manages to interpret ('But nothing's happening here,' said a woman in front of me, fidgeting nervously in her seat). It is a logic capable of restoring our thought of the body as a force at once precise and devastating and also, quite simply, beautiful, like the beauty associated with certain paintings that continually come to mind as we try to watch NVSBL. The power of this thought is demonstrated by such a reduction of movement in space as to render the very reality of the bodies inaccessible, because it deprives us of control over our own perception and consequently of presumed

control over bodies which our vision believed it could frame and interpret with its own memory models.”¹⁵⁴ This description is close to what I would define as the potentiality of duration: the reduction and absence of movement are so radical that they shatter the reality of the bodies and, at the same time, dispossess our perception.

Time becomes independent when it does not allow us to fill emptiness with meaning. In this performance, the images are structured in such a way that they do not allow us to focus on anything and retain things in our memory; time is so redundant that it takes control over our perception. The consequence of this temporal redundancy is the dispossession of our inner sense of time, whereby our attention no longer empowers our subjective experience. Quite the opposite: we are stuck, duration disables us, it takes over. When we are overwhelmed with a redundancy of time, duration does not stimulate our attention and does not enable a more intense awareness of the subject. Attention becomes rather impersonal, as described by Blanchot: “It is not the self that is attentive in attention; rather, with an extreme delicacy and through insensible, constant contacts, attention has always already detached me from myself, freeing me for the attention that I for an instant become.”¹⁵⁵ This is why duration does not stimulate our attention, activate us and make us more sensitive and open – more self-aware. Duration has nothing to do with tension. Quite the opposite is the case: during redundant time that is running out, we are stuck, with our attention waiting.

It is only when we approach duration as something that is related to the dispossession of subjectivity that it can be discussed as a potentially critical concept in contemporary culture. The two aforementioned works help us gain an insight into the current cultural and political dimensions of duration, which have different critical properties than the experiments with duration and temporality in the second half of the twentieth century.

In contemporary theatre, the stretching of time has long been at the forefront. For example, Lehmann writes that, in contemporary theatre, we often no longer speak of the representation of the timeline, but about the presentation in its own temporality. Duration in theatre does not portray duration; in other words; when the performance slows down, the slowness on stage does not refer to the slowness of the fictitious universe, which is supposed to fuse with our own experiential world. Temporality becomes an immanent 'conscious' element of the performance, by means of which theatre refers to its own process. This means that the experience of time expansion and, consequently, the various strategies for organizing the spectator's diffused perception are at the forefront. Theatre takes place and is organised in the gap between its fictitious time and the time of the audience.¹⁵⁶ Instead of representing homogenous time (dramatic time, the time of the subject, the time of the event, etc.), contemporary theatre takes place as a heterogeneity of temporalities, where a coherent temporality no longer exists. The performances experiment with time and the attention of the spectator; they break up the sequence and coherence of the events, experiment with memories and things that are yet to come, with repetition, with phenomenological experience, etc.

In this way, theatre has frequently been understood as the artistic field that defies the strict rationalization and effectiveness of homogenous time in contemporary capitalist society, enabling the parallel and heterogeneous experience of attention, and revealing the incoherence of the subject (e.g. Lehmann). When the temporal experience of the subject cannot be embraced as a coherent unit, but as a flexible, heterogeneous and contradictory one, the subject cannot be subjugated by the social organizational structures and the subject's experience of time is not subdued into effectiveness. In this way, contemporary performance seems to offer resistance to the social division of time and the understanding of time as a means of economic

effectiveness (where time is considered as economic value). As Adrian Heathfield writes, the theatre experiments of the early 1970s that introduce duration by means of various procedures (repetition, the expansion of the performance beyond the cultural convention, improvisation, coincidence and the non-materiality of the event) establish a critical understanding of time as a commodity and create unassailable values that cannot be subjugated by the existing social and cultural constructions of time, where time is closely connected to the effectiveness and rationalization of the social systems.¹⁵⁷

In the early 1970s, when theatre experiments brought duration into performance by means of various procedures, changes began to take place in the manner of subjectivisation in the wider social and cultural spheres that could be linked with emerging post-industrial society. The changes were connected with what was discussed by the Italian philosophers who detected deep changes in social organization. The difference between work and free time is disappearing; the communicative and linguistic dimension is at the forefront; human potentiality is at the core of production. The power of production becomes the thing that establishes us as human beings, as potent beings. This shift causes important changes in social organization and the cultural concepts of time.

Experimenting with time (simultaneousness, heterogeneity, synchronicity) is at the forefront, accompanied by play with time compression, crisis and release (both on the personal and social levels). Experimenting with time serves to enhance the effectiveness and production value of the subject, as well as the value of virtual predictions and projections (not only in the financial market, but also in social structures). As contradictory as it may sound, experimenting with time is what contributes to the subduing of the contemporary flexible subject. Time experimentation is an essential condition for the value of work itself.

Let's try to find evidence for this argument in contemporary artistic and cultural production. Most of those active in this field

are involved with projecting projects and realizing those projected projects. The time dimension is already contained in the term 'project': actions in the future, the actualisation of possibilities, etc. Despite the fact that experimenting and constant movement is at their core, projects are simultaneously part of a homogenous temporality that we feel as an intense acceleration at both the intimate and social levels. The heterogeneous character of projects, which involve exceptional human abilities, belong to an all-embracing homogenous temporality that does not enable a different social model of organization even though, paradoxically, it needs to constantly invent them in order for the project to succeed.¹⁵⁸

My question would therefore be as follows: what is the critical value of duration in the post-industrial situation, where the inner feeling of the subject increasingly fuses with the value of his/her productivity and where the heterogeneity of temporality is at the core of shaping contemporary subjectivity? What is the critical value of duration if the heterogeneity of time is part of the subduing of the subject, the appropriation of the subject's worth by the economy?

I see an essential difference in the following fact. A few decades ago, duration could be understood as a sort of visibility of activity (process, structure, immediacy, failure, coincidence, redundancy), and a way to manage the attention of the spectator and her/his sensibility. In the second half of the twentieth century, duration is therefore closely connected to the entry of work into the performance itself (e.g. improvisation in dance, where decisions are made in the present and the work is not hidden behind the dancing body) and to the emancipation of the performance process. Interestingly, this entry and visibility of work processes in the performance runs parallel to the new methods of post-industrial production, where work is no longer Fordist as a rule, but increasingly virtuosic. It takes place before others, i.e. the audience, and acquires increasingly commu-

nicative features.

Today, due to changes in the inner perception of time, which is so closely connected with the contemporary dispositives of multi-temporality, heterogeneity and flexibility, I feel that we need to think in the direction of duration as a dispossession that overwhelms us with non-functioning and non-operativity. In order for the subjects to last, they need to be literally dispossessed, forget themselves as a subject.¹⁵⁹ This is why even short time units can have a very long duration today. Due to the accelerated and projective character of our inner time, subjects find themselves in a no man's land if something does not function or if nothing is going on; they feel as though the duration intrudes upon them and, paradoxically, steals the most intimate time.

Duration, gives nothing in return; it does not sharpen our senses and nor do we acquire a different sensibility or intensiveness by yielding to it. Duration does not activate us; it only dispossesses us and fails to catch our attention. In the two aforementioned performances, duration does not cause sublime effects; if the performances do not irritate us so much that we leave immediately, we are suddenly stuck. We sit there in the midst of the performance and do not surrender to its flow, only try and get through it as though it were an obstacle, actually having to move through it step by step. Our attention waits "without precipitation, leaving empty what is empty and keeping our haste, our impatient desire, and, even more, our horror of emptiness from prematurely filling it up."¹⁶⁰

Culturally, duration can be deeply subversive, but not because it contrasts the experience of slowness with the experience of speed (after all, slow movement is a privilege of the rich and an inevitable for the poor). Duration irritates us because it can reveal how deeply our most intimate perception of time (i.e. the feeling that we are active beings and constantly on the move) is socially constructed and economically conditioned. For this reason, duration demolishes social and organisation protocols; the time

we have needs to dispossess us in order for us to be able to last. Since our daily life calls for ubiquitous and constant actualisation, duration does not enable actualisation, but quite the opposite. It places us into a state of pure potentiality, into what is still supposed to come. While lasting, we wait for time to run out. This dispossession through duration is not only characteristic of contemporary art; we can trace it in the arts to the 1960s onwards, where duration is at the forefront of numerous artistic experiments of live art, performance and film.¹⁶¹

By experimenting with duration and movement, the two performances I have described open up the problematics of dispossession, not because nothing is happening, but because the redundant time generated interferes heavily with the inner processes of subjectivisation: we are suddenly left with time, which means that being is potentially possible without self-actualization. This description also has concrete political and cultural implications. Slow observation that does not concentrate upon the actual effect, the dispossession in which we create something before it actually happens, characterises the manner of working in contemporary theatre and dance. This is especially true if performance is understood as the field of experimenting with and critically addressing the social and economic contexts in which we live and work. Duration also directly sabotages the organization of the social protocols of flexibility and mobility, especially when we are speaking of duration as a specific relationship with movement. Contrastingly, continuous and accelerated movement (described by Sloterdijk as kinetic modernity)¹⁶², expels any kind of potency from the actualisation of the subject: professions need to be changed quickly, everything needs to be made usable, the future needs to be organized into a projection. Duration reveals that movement does not only belong to the activity of the subject; we only begin to last when moved by others – when we have been placed into the world.

Finally, let me illustrate the concept of duration with one

more image, a personal one from my former home city. It is an image of the view from the window of one of my previous homes. I lived near an old people's home, whose residents took walks in a small circular park, where one could do little but repeat the path over and over. Whenever I looked at the park through my window, I felt that something had changed in my perception of time. In the clamour of the city, a movement was revealed that could be looked at without a kinaesthetic feeling being triggered in my body. The duration of the people's walks shows itself as the slowness of the body no longer capable of the continuous and invisible transition of the city inhabitant. However, the walks the old people take always confirm to me that movement is not only about crossing a space, getting from point A to point B. This is also discussed by Deleuze: "Movement is not a unity of quantitative differences that can be endlessly multiplied."¹⁶³

Such is our global movement of today. Our subjectivity is organised as a unity of quantitative differences marked by an endless acceleration of the numeric differences between the places we have visited, the residences we have inhabited and the people we are connected with. Movement is not only a transient movement in space, but should also be understood as change, as quantitative differentiation. For example, Deleuze refers to the eminent philosophical parable of the fearless runner Achilles; despite his youth and strength, his movement resembles that of the old people in the park, who would represent the turtle in this parable. It is not about equal speed, but about an equal mode of duration. Achilles's movement can be quantitatively divided into steps; with every step, the movement changes in a qualitative way. Deleuze says: "What seems from the outside to be a numerical part, a component of the run, turns out to be, experienced from the inside, an obstacle avoided."¹⁶⁴ The inner perception of movement is therefore quantitative and enables change, precisely because movement concerns us from the

outside.

The interesting thing about those no longer young bodies taking their walks might be precisely that the experience of movement as qualitative change shows on the surface of the body. Movement is a relationship. It constantly dispossesses us by means of obstacles that we cannot react to if we wish to move. One of the basic illusions of the contemporary subject is that we only move because of our inner feeling of time. This illusion also serves as a basis for constantly subduing contemporary subjectivity to an increasing number of dispositives that promise even greater mobility to defeat our ontological slowness.

The time of the subject is therefore not a homogenous projecting time, a possibility that constantly needs to be realised. Rather, it is constantly avoiding obstacles, involuntary movement, a slowness in which time itself is running out. The German anthropologist and philosopher Odo Marquard writes that the obsession with speed in contemporary culture can also be understood as an incessant acceleration of the speed of life, a response to the ontological fact of the shortness of human life. Marquard claims that, in comparison to death, all human life is fundamentally slow. Only in this way can we bear the shortness of human life in comparison to the world around it, the fact that we are but a "niche in time".¹⁶⁵ Human beings need to have a sense of slowness because this is the only way to differentiate those changes that are desired and possible. Maybe that's why the relation between duration and movement is so important: it enables a waiting in which we look at something that is not yet there.